TN 4 (02-18)

A. PR 18-035 Entitlement to Survivor’s Benefits as Number Holder’s Widower Where Claimant Pleaded Guilty to Manslaughter of Number Holder

Date: December 20, 2017

1. Syllabus

The number holder (NH) died in Mississippi; therefore, we look to the Mississippi law to determine if the claimant is entitled to survivor’s benefits as the NH’s widower. The Mississippi law establishes that manslaughter is a felony violation of the law punished with death or confinement in the penitentiary. The claimant pleaded to manslaughter in causing the death of the NH and was sentenced to serve eighteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Claimant’s guilty plea to manslaughter is a felony conviction for purposes of the Act and Regulation (20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b)), but the Agency only preclude entitlement to survivor’s benefits if the claimant was “convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death. Based on the evidence provided, it does not indicate that Claimant was convicted of intentionally causing the NH’s death. Therefore, based on the evidence provided, the Claimant’s manslaughter conviction does not preclude him from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower.

2. Opinion

QUESTION

You asked whether the guilty plea of M~ (Claimant) in Mississippi to manslaughter in the death of G~, the number-holder (NH), precludes him from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower.

OPINION

Based on the evidence provided, Claimant’s manslaughter conviction does not preclude him from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower.

BACKGROUND

According to the information provided, NH died on January XX, 1993, while domiciled in Mississippi. NH’s death certificate listed the cause of death as a gunshot to the right temple and characterized her manner of death as a homicide. NH’s death certificate lists Claimant as her husband.

In November 1993, the Circuit Court of C~ County, Mississippi, ordered the amendment of an indictment against Claimant from murder to manslaughter. That same day, Claimant pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In December 1993, the court sentenced him to serve eighteen years in prison. The state released Claimant on parole in January 2001 and his parole ended in August 2001.

In March 2017, Claimant applied for survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower. In a signed statement dated March XX, 2017, Claimant provided the following details about NH’s death. On January XX, 1993, NH was driving a vehicle near C~, Mississippi, with Claimant as a passenger. They began arguing and she pulled a gun on him. She stopped the car at the side of the road. They fought over the gun and he was able to get it away from her. The gun went off accidentally and she was shot in the head. He did not intend to shoot her. He subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

In July 2017, the agency contacted the C~ County District Attorney’s Office, which indicated that all its records relative to Claimant’s case had been destroyed and there were no trial transcripts because Claimant had signed a plea agreement.

DISCUSSION

Generally, the widower of an individual who died fully insured is entitled to widow’s insurance benefits (WIB) if he is not married, has attained age sixty, and files an application. See Social Security Act (Act) § 202(f)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335 (2017);¹ Program Operations Manual System (POMS) RS 00207.001.A.1; see also Act § 216(g) (defining the term “widower”). A claimant also may be eligible for a lump sum death payment (LSDP) if the claimant is the widower of an individual who died fully or currently insured and he was living in the same household as the deceased at the time of her death or would be eligible for WIB. See Act § 202(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.390, 404.391; POMS RS 00210.001. However, agency regulations provide that a claimant may not become entitled to any survivor’s benefits (e.g., WIB and LSDP) on the earnings record of a person if the claimant was “convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b); see POMS GN 00304.060.A.1 (referenced in POMS RS 00207.001.A.1 (discussing when WIB not payable) and POMS RS 00210.020.A, .C (discussing when LSDP not payable)).

In November 1993, pursuant to an amended indictment, Claimant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the Circuit Court of C~ County, Mississippi. Agency regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) does not define the term “convicted.” The United States Supreme Court has held that a plea of guilty is, in and of itself, a conviction and, like a jury verdict, is conclusive. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). Similarly, Mississippi law states, “a person indicted for a criminal offense shall not be convicted thereof, unless by confession of his guilt in open court or by admitting the truth of the charge against him by his plea, or by the verdict of a jury accepted and recorded in court.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-3(1) (West 2017).²

Mississippi law also establishes that manslaughter is a felony. In Mississippi, a felony is any violation of law punished with death or confinement in the penitentiary.³ See Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-11. Mississippi law indicates a manslaughter conviction may be punishable by imprisonment in county jail or placement in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-25(1). The court sentenced Claimant to serve eighteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Accordingly, Claimant’s guilty plea to manslaughter is a felony conviction for purposes of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).

The evidence, however, does not indicate that Claimant was convicted of intentionally causing NH’s death. The agency defines “intent” as:

A wish or expectancy that an act will have a certain result (regardless of the actual likelihood of such a result).

The presence of will in the commission of a criminal act where the individual is fully aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit. This applies whether the individual desires that such consequences occur or is indifferent as to their occurrence.

POMS GN 00304.060.B.1. Under agency policy, there is a presumption of a lack of intent when a claimant is convicted of involuntary manslaughter. See POMS GN 00304.065.B. There is no presumption when a claimant is convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and facts relative to the slaying must be developed. See id. To determine intent, the agency looks to the laws of the state where the crime occurred. See id.; see also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 89-6c (adopting as policy the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1989), where the court held a conviction for second-degree manslaughter was an intentional killing under agency policy given Kentucky’s definition of second-degree manslaughter); SSR 87-23 (explaining the agency bases its decision regarding intent on whether state law treats voluntary manslaughter as an intentional homicide and examines the facts of the case if state law is inconclusive). Where state law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the agency follows the steps for voluntary manslaughter. See POMS GN 00304.065.B.

Mississippi law has at least eleven different statutes addressing manslaughter. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-27, 97-3-29, 97-3-31, 97-3-33, 97-3-35, 97-3-37, 97-3-39, 97-3-41, 97-3-43, 97-3-45, 97-3-47. The Mississippi Court of Appeals has explained, however, that with regard to intentionality, Mississippi law has codified two different types of manslaughter: “heat of passion” (i.e., voluntary) manslaughter under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-35, and general (i.e., involuntary) manslaughter under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47. See Miller v. State, 733 So. 2d 846, 849-50 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998); see also Nolan v. State, 61 So. 3d 887, 899 (Miss. 2011) (Randolph, J., concurring) (stating that “the general manslaughter statute . . . , being tied historically to common-law involuntary manslaughter, does not require intent”). Thus, “heat of passion” manslaughter is defined as “[t]he killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-35; see Miller, 733 So. 2d at 849. General manslaughter is defined as “[e]very other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without authority of law, not provided for in this title . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47; see Miller, 733 So. 2d at 850.

Although Mississippi has separate statutes for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, Claimant’s conviction does not indicate which statute applied to his conviction. Because the evidence does not indicate whether Claimant was convicted under Mississippi’s voluntary or involuntary manslaughter statute, no presumption of a lack of intent applies to Claimant’s conviction, and the facts relative to the slaying must be developed. See POMS GN 00304.065.B; see also SSR 87-23.

In Claimant’s statement dated March XX, 2017, he described NH’s slaying as accidental, not intentional. There are no other records containing facts relative to NH’s slaying. Agency regulations only preclude entitlement to survivor’s benefits if the claimant was “convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) (emphasis added). Because the only available facts about NH’s slaying show Claimant did not intentionally cause her death, her slaying based on the facts as presently known does not preclude him from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as her widower. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).

CONCLUSION

Based on the evidence provided, Claimant’s manslaughter conviction does not preclude him from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower.

Footnotes:

[1]

^. All references to the Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2017 edition.

[2]

^. All citations to Mississippi’s State Code are to West’s 2017 Annotated Mississippi Code.

[3]

^. Mississippi law defines penitentiary as any facility under the jurisdiction of the Mississippi Department of Corrections that is used for the confinement of convicted felons. See Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-3.